Three scenarios facing Jordan and the Palestinians

Jordan and Palestinians in the West Bank are awaiting the results of the Israeli elections to determine who will form the next Israeli government and what its agenda will be.

In any case, the West Bank faces three scenarios, all of which leave Jordan and the West Bank caught between two right-wing forces. The outcomes of these scenarios could be progressively worse, particularly when considering the cost of another regional war and its implications for the entire region, including the West Bank and Jordan’s geopolitical position.

The competition between Netanyahu’s camp and the opposition is not limited to who will become prime minister. It also extends to the future of settlements, the nature of Israeli control over the West Bank and relations with Washington. None of Netanyahu’s leading rivals currently supports the establishment of a Palestinian state in the foreseeable future. This means that, under any scenario, there will be no Palestinian state, leaving the West Bank facing an uncertain future.

The first scenario is Netanyahu’s return to power with an alliance of the far right, particularly if Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir retain their influence within the government. This would accelerate settlement expansion and the legalization of settlement outposts, creating legal and administrative realities that bring the West Bank closer to de facto annexation. It would also increase pressure on Palestinian communities, including Bedouin communities and areas near settlements, while weakening the Palestinian Authority and restricting its ability to administer areas under its responsibility, potentially leading to displacement.

The second scenario involves the possibility of Gadi Eisenkot winning and forming an alternative government. His arrival as prime minister could lead to a softening of some of the most extreme policies, but it would not necessarily mean a fundamental change in relations with the Palestinians.

Eisenkot opposes comprehensive annexation, criticizes settler violence and unauthorized outposts, and opposes construction in the sensitive E1 area east of Jerusalem. Settlement expansion there could separate the northern West Bank from its southern areas and deepen the isolation of East Jerusalem.

He may seek to improve relations with Washington and European countries and ease some of the political and administrative pressure on Palestinians without ending the occupation. He would seek to improve Israel’s image and relations with the West, changing the way the conflict is managed and adopting a softer approach without making fundamental changes. Like Netanyahu, however, he opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state. He could become involved in what might be described as gradual or “soft” displacement rather than forced displacement.

The third scenario is that neither camp succeeds in forming a government. This remains a possibility and could lead to lengthy coalition negotiations, a caretaker government or new elections if attempts to form a government fail. In this case, the status quo could continue, while right-wing forces might exploit the situation to impose further realities on the ground.

The challenge will be to stop these developments rather than merely change the names in government. This is what Jordan and the Palestinians hope to achieve. However, all three scenarios present serious risks. Another regional war could once again reshape the situation and threaten Jordan and the West Bank through annexation, displacement, developments surrounding Jerusalem and the possible collapse of the Palestinian Authority. It could also push the West Bank toward every conceivable outcome at a decisive and particularly dangerous moment.

From the Israeli elections to the US midterm elections, amid the region’s ongoing crises and the possibility of another major war regardless of the election results, Jordan and the West Bank face critical challenges that will directly affect both. There are few signs of optimism on the horizon, suggesting that the outcome ahead may be worse than the uncertainty of waiting.