It all began with President Trump speaking to people in his inner circle about “something much bigger” being prepared for the Middle East. Shortly afterward, media leaks began circulating about a plan for wide-ranging arrangements in the region once the war with Iran ends.
The plan reportedly has four main components: regional arrangements to contain Iran, including a broad regional alliance bringing together the United States, Israel, and major Arab countries; expanding the Abraham Accords to move toward a more advanced phase of Arab and Muslim normalization with Israel; implementing the second phase of Trump’s plan for the Gaza Strip; and, finally, security arrangements governing Israel’s relations with Syria and Lebanon.
According to the leaks, the proposed plan will not be implemented until after Israel’s Knesset elections and the US congressional elections.
Judging by the main elements of the proposed plan assuming the US administration does not back away from it. It appears designed to avoid the consequences of the US failure in the region following the war with Iran, rather than address the Middle East’s real problems. It reflects a desire to shift the burden of that failure onto the countries of the region and secure Israel’s security interests, without offering any concessions that could pave the way for a just peace. The proposed ideas make no meaningful reference to the core of the Arab Israeli conflict or to a peaceful settlement based on a two-state solution.
For this reason, the proposals appear to offer no common ground on which all parties could agree.
It is clear that the US administration is linking the presentation of the plan to the outcome of the Israeli elections. It appears to be counting on a change in the governing coalition that would be more flexible and responsive to the requirements of normalization with countries in the region, as well as to a partial withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as part of the second phase. It also appears to be seeking a relaxation of Israel’s stringent conditions for a security agreement with Syria that would address its security concerns, as well as a similar arrangement with Lebanon that would give Beirut the leverage needed to move forward with efforts to restrict weapons and contain Hezbollah militarily.
It will not be easy for Arab countries, particularly those in the Gulf, to join a security alliance with Israel aimed at confronting Iran, especially after the painful experience of open warfare with Iran and what it revealed about the fragility of the US-Gulf security umbrella. The prevailing approach in the Gulf at present is to pursue regional understandings with Iran that would restore the framework of relations that existed before the US-Israeli war against it, while also avoiding further military and economic escalation.
There is no longer anyone in the Arab world willing to take the risk of normalizing relations with Israel without a political return that addresses the roots of the Palestinian issue and permanently defuses the region’s persistent tensions.
Security arrangements with Syria and Lebanon are not sufficient to justify concessions on the scale of normalization with Israel or entering into an alliance with it against Tehran. These countries know full well that, according to this view, Israel’s ultimate objective is to foment internal turmoil in Iran that would eventually lead to the overthrow of the Supreme Leader’s regime.
Change in Israel following the elections is far from guaranteed. Netanyahu still has a chance of forming a governing coalition or, in the worst-case scenario, preventing the opposition from forming an alternative government. Even if the opposition wins, it is unlikely, contrary to what some believe, to be prepared to adopt political approaches that are less hard-line than Netanyahu’s.
In short, the initial ideas surrounding the plan belong to the realm of political fantasy, a domain in which Washington under the current administration has demonstrated considerable skill.



